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1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance programs insure workers against the risk that they may lose
their job through no fault of their own. Such insurance, however, is associated with many
potential incentive problems. One such incentive problem is moral hazard. For instance,
in the presence of insurance, unemployed agents might reduce the search effort, thereby
reducing the speed of transition to gainful employment. The literature on the optimal
provision of unemployment insurance (e.g., Baily (1978), Shavell and Weiss (1979), and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)) concentrates on providing incentives for optimal search
effort. In this paper, we study the incentive problem associated with fraudulent collection
of unemployment benefits.
There are several types of unemployment insurance fraud. Examples include collect-
ing unemployment benefits after quitting a job, while being employed, or after refusing a
suitable offer. Table 1 below illustrates the overpayments incurred by the unemployment
insurance program for different types of fraud.
Table 1: Unemployment Insurance Overpayments in the U.S., 2007
Cause Percent of Fraud Overpayments
Concealed Earnings 60.06
Insufficient Job Search 4.95
Refused Suitable Offer 0.80
Quits 7.06
Fired 13.29
Unavailable for Work 4.17
Other 9.67
Total 100.00
Source: Benefit Accuracy Measurement program, U.S. Department of Labor
Our focus here is on concealed earnings: the case where an agent currently collecting
benefits finds a job, but continues collecting unemployment benefits. As noted in the Table,
the benefits overpaid because of such fraud, in 2007, were ten times the overpayment due
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to unemployed agents not actively searching or refusing suitable work. (See Appendix A
for more details.) That is, even if the unemployment insurance program were designed
to elicit sufficient effort by each unemployed agent, the savings for the program would be
dwarfed by the corresponding savings generated by an unemployment insurance program
designed to prevent fraud. Furthermore, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (2005) use
randomized trials in four U.S. sites and find that insufficient job search is not a significant
source of unemployment insurance overpayments.
The contribution of our paper is to provide an optimal unemployment insurance mech-
anism in an environment where an agent can commit fraud by concealing his true employ-
ment status. All of the agents in our model have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
preferences, are initially unemployed, and face stochastic opportunities to transition to em-
ployment. Those who are employed receive positive wage income, while those who remain
unemployed receive zero wage income. There is no search effort to find employment. Em-
ployment is assumed to be an absorbing state. The employed agent could conceal the fact
that he has found a job and continue to claim unemployment benefits. The Unemployment
Insurance agency has a costly monitoring technology to detect the agent’s employment
status. Our mechanism efficiently provides benefits and utilizes the monitoring technology
to deter potential fraud.
We set up the problem in continuous time and represent incentive constraints as differen-
tial equations, similar to Zhang (2009). We then formulate the contracting problem as one
of optimal control and apply the Pontryagin minimum principle to study the dynamics of
unemployment insurance policies. We deliver a pre-commitment mechanism that optimally
provides unemployment insurance in the presence of persistent private information.
In our model, the Unemployment Insurance agency uses two instruments to deter fraud:
tax/subsidy and monitoring. Both instruments are costly. The first instrument distorts
consumption relative to full insurance. The second instrument has a direct cost.
Since employment is an absorbing state in our model, the treatment of the worker
who transitioned to employment is straightforward – constant consumption forever and
no monitoring. Since employment status is private information, the Unemployment Insur-
ance agency distorts consumption and does not fully insure the unemployed worker. The
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Unemployment Insurance agency also uses the monitoring instrument to provide incentives.
We consider two monitoring mechanisms: deterministic verification and stochastic veri-
fication. Under deterministic verification, the worker is either verified with probability one
or not verified at all. We focus on this case for most of the paper since it is analytically
tractable. All of our results below are for this case. We show later that our results remain
the same under stochastic verification where the worker is verified with probability be-
tween zero and one. That is, even though our deterministic mechanism appears restrictive,
the general mechanism of stochastic verification does not offer more economic insights on
unemployment insurance and monitoring.
We show that under deterministic verification the interval between consecutive moni-
toring periods is a constant, independent of history. That is, the monitoring consists of
cycles and occurs in pre-specified periods. With CARA preferences, the worker’s utility
flows in a new cycle are proportional to those in the previous cycle. Hence, his incentive to
commit fraud remains the same and he is monitored in the same manner as in the previous
cycle.
The optimal unemployment benefits in our model decrease monotonically with the du-
ration of unemployment. Benefits remain relatively flat between verifications with a sharp
decline immediately after a verification.
A novel feature of our optimal mechanism is that it implies a nonmonotonic tax on
employment in order to provide incentives. Within a monitoring cycle, the consumption for
the worker who transitions to employment earlier exceeds that of the worker who transitions
later. However, the consumption for the worker who transitions to employment shortly
before a verification period is less than that of the worker who transitions shortly after.
Another type of fraud is that employed agents can quit their jobs, become unemployed,
and start collecting unemployment benefits. Even though an employed agent in our model
can commit such fraud, the incentives in our optimal contract ensure that the agent does
not engage in such fraudulent behavior.
We perform a quantitative analysis similar to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and find
that the optimal auditing cost is less than 60 percent of the cost incurred by the U.S. unem-
ployment insurance system. Furthermore, using the same resources as the U.S. system the
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optimal contract delivers higher utility to the average worker: 1.55 percent higher consump-
tion at every date. This gain arises from two sources: (i) improved consumption smoothing
between employed and unemployed states and (ii) reduced monitoring costs or higher aver-
age consumption. The U.S. system spends only 0.24 percent its resources on monitoring the
average worker and spends the rest on unemployment benefits (net of wages), but the same
resources are allocated differently in the optimal contract: 0.17 percent is spent on moni-
toring the average worker and the rest is spent on unemployment benefits. Thus, almost
all of the gain in the optimal contract comes from improved consumption smoothing.
Several remarks are in order here regarding our model choices and concealed earnings
fraud. First, preventing concealed earnings fraud in our model is a matter of inducing an
unemployed worker who finds a job not to delay reporting the transition to employment.
One might think such fraud could be automatically detected by cross-matching the un-
employment insurance records with the employment records. Indeed, the cross-matching
technology has been available to the unemployment insurance agencies in every state for
more than a decade. (Recall that unemployment insurance is administered at the state
level in the U.S. and each state has its own eligibility rules.) However, as noted in Table
A.2, Appendix A, only 7.5 percent of the fraud cases are detected by cross-matching with
the state’s directory of new hires. For instance, cross-matching technology would not au-
tomatically catch a worker who is collecting unemployment benefits in one state, but is
employed in another state. Furthermore, even within each state, since the directory of new
hires is updated monthly, some workers who truthfully report unemployment in a specific
week may show up in a cross-match of employment records and be mistakenly flagged for
fraud. In most cases when a worker appears in both unemployment insurance records and
employment records, further investigation is necessary to determine if fraud has actually
occurred.
Second, the worker could commit a more nuanced form of concealed earnings fraud
by truthfully reporting the transition to employment but underreporting the earnings.
(The worker could collect some unemployment benefits as long as the reported earnings are
sufficiently low.) In 2007, according to the Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program
data, roughly 40 percent of those committing concealed earnings fraud reported positive
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earnings. Again, an automatic technology that cross-matches the unemployment insurance
records with wage records (updated quarterly) in each state would not be sufficient to
detect most of the cases of concealed earnings fraud; In 2007, less than 2 percent of the
cases were caught using such a cross-match (see Table A.2, Appendix A). In fact, employees
working in a sector not covered by the UI system will never show up in the State Wage
records (e.g. federal employees, self-employed). Clearly, more than 90 percent of concealed
earnings fraud was missed by the cross-matching technology that uses both the directory
of new hires and the wage records. The detection involves a case-by-case investigation and,
thus, a per-case cost as in our model, and our mechanism offers an optimal approach to
deter the fraud.1
Third, a form of concealed earnings fraud could be collecting unemployment benefits
while working “off-the-books” where the worker is paid in cash. The BAM data, however,
suggests that the fraud is occurring when the worker is in “official” or “on-the-books”
employment. While the worker is committing concealed earnings fraud, his weekly earnings
are similar to the weekly earnings in the pre-unemployment job (which, by design, has to
be official for the worker to collect unemployment benefits). In 2007, for example, those
committing the fraud were earning 82 percent of their previous job’s wages, on average.
One-fourth of those committing the fraud were earning more while collecting benefits than
before they became unemployed. Earnings of this magnitude are suggestive of official
employment.2
Fourth, we do not have search effort in our model, so we do not provide incentives
for finding employment. One could argue that providing incentives for the search effort
could result in more cost savings, relative to fraud detection, by moving agents from the
unemployed pool to the employed pool at a faster rate. However, this margin turns out to
1Our model does not allow for a strategic choice of the earnings to report, but can nevertheless be used
to examine the nuanced fraud. The incentives to cheat in our model depend on the difference in wages
between two states: employed and unemployed. The latter is normalized to zero in our analysis, but we
can easily replicate the analysis for a positive wage in the unemployed state and for a different wage gap
between the two states.
2There is an interview component to the BAM program that may capture some cash earnings, but these
cases are at most 10.5 percent of the sample (see Table A.2, Appendix A).
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be quantitatively insignificant in the previous models of optimal unemployment insurance.
In Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), for instance, the unemployed agent’s optimal search
effort and the optimal duration of unemployment are almost the same as those in the
current unemployment insurance program; in Wang and Williamson (2002), the optimal
insurance does not encourage more job search effort than what is implied by the current
unemployment insurance program. The cost savings in these models come from reduced
benefits on average and better distribution of benefits based on duration of unemployment.
This channel of cost savings is present in our model as well.
Finally, a strand of the unemployment insurance literature has focused on monitoring
search effort and/or monitoring acceptance of job offers. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992),
for instance, examine a model where agents can reject job offers. An exogenous fraction of
agents who reject job offers are denied benefits. In our optimal mechanism, the unemployed
agent who receives an opportunity to become employed has no incentive to refuse the
opportunity. Setty (2011) analyzes an optimal unemployment insurance scheme in a model
where the agent’s search effort is monitored. In our model, we use the monitoring technology
to detect concealed earnings. Empirically, as noted in Table 1, fraudulent behavior in search
effort or refusal of suitable work is not as costly to the Unemployment Insurance agency as
concealment of earnings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model.
In Section 3 we establish two properties of the optimal mechanism: scaling and periodic
monitoring. In Section 4 we use these properties to analyze the optimal unemployment
insurance scheme with exogenously given monitoring dates. Then, we characterize the op-
timal monitoring dates in Section 5. In Section 6 we show that our mechanism prevents
employed workers from quitting. In Section 7 we discuss an extension of our model to the
stochastic monitoring case, where the Unemployment Insurance agency optimally chooses
the probability of verification. In this section, we also describe the similarities and dif-
ferences between the insights from the deterministic mechanism and the insights from the
stochastic mechanism. We conclude in Section 8.
7
2 Model
The Unemployment Insurance authority is a risk-neutral principal with a discount rate
r > 0. She provides insurance to a risk-averse worker, whose preferences are given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtrv(c(t))dt
]
,
where c(t) is consumption at time t, v(c) = −e−ρc is a CARA utility function with risk
aversion ρ, r is the discount rate, and E is the expectation operator. Note that the flow
utility is rv(c) and that the agent’s subjective discount rate is the same as the principal’s.
A worker can be either employed with wage w > 0 or unemployed with wage zero. The
worker is unemployed at t = 0 and transitions to employment with Poisson rate pi > 0. We
assume that employment is permanent. (For similar assumptions, see the unemployment
insurance model of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and the disability insurance model of
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006).)
The worker’s employment status is private information, so an employed worker can
claim to be unemployed and continue collecting the unemployment benefits. We refer to
this as fraud. The principal can verify the worker’s unemployment report at a cost of γ
units of the consumption good.3 Verification reveals the worker’s true employment status.
We study pre-commitment mechanisms that efficiently deliver unemployment benefits
and deter fraud. In addition to the tax/subsidy instrument used by the unemployment
insurance literature, our mechanism uses the monitoring instrument to provide incentives.
We assume that the principal always collects the wage, so an unemployed worker can
never claim to be employed. Hence, there is no need for verification when the worker
reports a transition to employment. Furthermore, since employment is an absorbing state,
verification is unnecessary forever if the worker reports to be employed just once in the
past. The incentive problem then reduces to ensuring that an employed worker does not
claim to be unemployed.
We focus on deterministic verification mechanisms: in each period the worker is either
3As noted in the Introduction, more than 90 percent of the overpayments due to concealed earnings were
not easily detectable by the State authorities using standard procedures available to them. See Appendix
A for technologies used to detect Concealed Earnings fraud.
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verified with probability one or not verified at all. This mechanism is sub-optimal; it is
dominated by a stochastic verification mechanism in our environment. One may then ask
why study the deterministic case? Our goal is to characterize the optimal combination
of the two instruments: tax/subsidy and monitoring. In Section 7, we show that the key
economic insights on these two instruments are nearly identical in both the deterministic
and stochastic cases. In both cases, optimal monitoring and employment tax have the same
pattern. The stochastic monitoring case requires cumbersome notation and provides less
intuition so we start by analyzing the deterministic case.
In our deterministic mechanism, the verification in any period is based on the history of
employment status reports and past verifications outcomes. Since verification is necessary
only for agents who have been reporting unemployment in every period in the past, a
sufficient statistic for past history is the duration of unemployment reports. In other
words, at t = 0 the principal commits to all future verification periods, mapping durations of
unemployment reports to {0, 1}. In a verification period, clearly no worker would misreport.
(Any penalty  > 0 induces truth telling in the verification period.) Thus, the principal
does not have to keep track of the outcomes of past verifications. We represent the set of
verification periods as {mi; i = 1, 2, ...}, where mi is the date of the ith verification.4
The timing is as follows. In the initial period, the worker is unemployed. Then the
stochastic job opportunity arrives. The worker either remains unemployed or transitions
to employment. He then chooses to report either employment or unemployment to the
principal. Conditional on the unemployment report, the principal verifies the true employ-
ment status if the period is a verification period. Then, conditional on the report and
the outcome of the verification, the principal assigns current and future consumptions. In
subsequent periods, if the worker reported employment in the past, he is in an absorbing
state and no further reports are necessary. If the worker reported unemployment in every
period in the past, then the sequence of events is the same as in the initial period.
If an unemployed worker transitions to employment at t, let cE(t, s) denote his con-
4There is no loss of generality in assuming a countable collection of verification periods. Since each
verification costs γ > 0, the principal would not want to verify infinitely many times in any finite time
interval.
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sumption at time s ≥ t. Because the principal and the worker have the same discount rate
and employment is an absorbing state, efficiency requires that the worker’s consumption
remain constant after t for all s. We therefore suppress s in cE(t, s) and denote this con-
stant level of consumption as cE(t). The flow utility from this level of consumption then
is rv
(
cE(t)
)
. We denote the discounted sum of utilities to a worker who accepts a job
offer for the first time at t as E(t), i.e., E(t) =
∫∞
t
e−r(s−t)rv(cE(t))ds = v(cE(t)). Since
employment status is private information, E(t) is also the continuation utility to a worker
who accepted an offer before t, but reports employment for the first time at t.
An unemployed worker’s consumption at t is denoted by cU(t) and his flow utility is
rv(cU(t)). His continuation utility,
U(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)e−pi(x−t)rv(cU(x))dx+
∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)e−pi(x−t)piE(x)dx,
is the sum of expected utilities before and after the transition (e−pi(x−t) in the first integral is
the conditional probability of remaining unemployed at date x and e−pi(x−t)pi in the second
integral is the density function of the transition time). Hence,
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(r+pi)(x−t) (piE(x) + ru(x)) dx
=
∫ s
t
e−(r+pi)(x−t) (piE(x) + ru(x)) dx+ e−(r+pi)(s−t)U(s), for all t < s, (1)
where u(x) ≡ v(cU(x)). We will refer to (1) as promise-keeping constraints.
The principal commits at t = 0 to verification periods {mi; i = 1, 2, ...} and consump-
tions
{
(cE(t), cU(t)); t ≥ 0}. The verification periods and consumptions are history depen-
dent. We denote this pre-commitment contract as σ.
Incentive compatibility requires that a worker who transitioned to employment at t ∈
(mi,mi+1) does not have the incentive to delay the report of the transition to a later time
s ∈ (t,mi+1), i.e., report unemployment and commit fraud from t to s, and then report
employment from s onward:
E(t) ≥
∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)rv(cU(x) + w)dx+ e−r(s−t)E(s),∀s ∈ (t,mi+1). (2)
Note that the worker cannot delay the report beyond the next verification period mi+1.
10
We restrict contract allocations to
E(t) ≥ U(t), for all t. (3)
Restriction (3) rules out the fraud due to refusal of offers noted in Table 1 (0.8 percent of
total fraud overpayments). This restriction can be derived by adding a job-refusal option
to our model. For ease of exposition we have imposed the restriction on the mechanism;
Appendix B describes the job-refusal option and derives this restriction.
The expected cost for the principal is
C(σ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+pi)t
(
picE(t) + rcU(t)
)
dt+
∑
i
e−(r+pi)miγ.
There should, in fact, be an additional term in C(σ): the discounted income obtained by the
principal, piw
r+pi
. However, unlike the unemployment insurance literature that endogenizes
job-finding probabilities, the discounted income in our model is a constant, so it does not
affect the optimal σ.
The principal’s problem is to find an incentive compatible σ that minimizes C(σ) and
delivers the initial promised utility U(0), i.e.,
min
σ
C(σ) (4)
subject to U(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+pi)t (piE(t) + ru(t)) dt,
and constraints (2), (3).
With a slight abuse of notation, denote the principal’s cost function as C(U(0)).5
3 A Simplification of the Optimal Contract
We begin our analysis by presenting two features of the optimal contract. In Section 3.1
we establish a “scaling” property. Then, in Section 3.2 we show that the optimal monitoring
5Ravikumar and Zhang (2012) analyze the problem of tax compliance in a costly state verification
model where the verification technology is imperfect (a low-income agent might be mistakenly labeled as
high income). They solve for the principal’s cost function using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
In contrast, we study optimal unemployment insurance in an environment with a perfect verification
technology. We characterize the path of unemployment benefits by formulating the optimal control problem
and using the Pontryagin minimum principle.
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is periodic. These properties simplify our analysis of the optimal contract by narrowing
the search of a solution to problem (4) to a smaller space.
To help us simplify, we rewrite problem (4) in terms of continuation utilities E(·), U(·)
and flow variable u(·), instead of consumptions. The objective becomes
C(σ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+pi)t (pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t))) dt+
∑
i
e−(r+pi)miγ,
where c : (−∞, 0)→ R denotes the inverse of the utility function:
c(v) = − log(−v)/ρ. (5)
The incentive constraint (2) becomes
E(t) ≥
∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)e−ρwru(x)dx+ e−r(s−t)E(s),∀s ∈ (t,mi+1), (6)
since CARA utility implies that v(cU(x) + w) = e−ρwv(cU(x)) = e−ρwu(x).
3.1 Scaling
Our mechanism exhibits a scaling property: if the initial promise U(0) is scaled by
α > 0, then the optimal contract is also scaled by α. More formally,
Lemma 1 If {(U(t), E(t), u(t)) ; t ≥ 0} are optimal utilities for initial promise U(0), then
the optimal utilities for initial promise αU(0) are
{(αU(t), αE(t), αu(t)) ; t ≥ 0} .
Alternatively, Lemma 1 states that the consumption of the worker with initial promise
αU(0) differs from that of the worker with promise U(0) by a constant, − log(α)/ρ, at all
dates and states.
The scaling property in Lemma 1 is related to the fact that CARA utility has no wealth
effect. Although a worker with high promised utility consumes (permanently) more than
a worker with low promised utility, the level of promised utility does not have an effect on
the worker’s incentives to conceal earnings. In other words, the incentive constraint (6)
holds when all of the utilities are scaled by the same factor.
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Since the incentives to conceal earnings are the same for workers with different promised
utilities, the optimal sequence of monitoring dates, {mi; i ≥ 1}, is independent of the initial
promised utility. Again, no wealth effect implies that the level of promised utility does not
change how the worker is monitored, even if it does change the worker’s consumption.
3.2 Periodicity
At time 0, the principal knows the true employment status of the agent. After the
verification at m1, the principal again knows the true employment status. Hence, the
continuation problem at m1 is the same as the problem at time 0, except for the “initial”
promised utility. The scaling property implies that, if U(m1) = αU(0), then the optimal
utilities from m1 forward are scaled by α. Thus, starting with a promise U(0), if the
principal finds it optimal to monitor the unemployed agent at m1, then it must be the case
that starting with the promise αU(0) the principal would again find it optimal to monitor
at m1. Put differently, having monitored the agent at m1, the next optimal monitoring
period is 2m1. We immediately conclude that
Proposition 1 The optimal monitoring is periodic, i.e., mi = im1 for all i ≥ 1.
To understand the intuition for the periodic monitoring, consider policies where the
interval between verifications is either increasing or decreasing over time. First, it is sub-
optimal for the planner to verify more frequently at the beginning. Since the worker starts
out unemployed, he stays unemployed for some duration initially. Frequent verifications
early on merely incur unnecessary verification cost. Second, one might think that it is opti-
mal to verify more frequently later since the probability of a long duration of unemployment
is small. However, this policy is also suboptimal. The worker’s conditional probability of
transitioning to employment is independent of how long he has been unemployed. More-
over, because the principal knows the true employment status after each verification, the
scaling property implies that from the principal’s perspective the worker who was just ver-
ified to be unemployed is no different from the worker at time zero. Thus the interval
between consecutive monitoring periods is a constant.
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While we have established that the optimal monitoring is periodic, finding the optimal
periodicity is difficult. To determine the optimal m1 we must first determine the optimal
utilities in the intervals [0,m1], [m1, 2m1], etc. Toward this end, we break the principal’s
problem into two steps. First, assume that m1 is exogenous and the principal learns the
agent’s employment status at dates m1, 2m1, etc. Given m1, the principal solves for
the endogenous utility paths in [0,m1], [m1, 2m1], etc. Second, the principal chooses m1
optimally. We analyze the first step in the next section and the second step in section 5.
4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Exogenous
Monitoring
Given the simplification in Section 3, we now present the features of the optimal unem-
ployment insurance scheme. For a given m1, we first formulate the optimal control problem
in Section 4.1. This allows us to analyze the time paths of the variables of interest. We
then describe some features of the continuation utilities E(·) and U(·) in Section 4.2 and
use these features to illustrate the employment tax in Section 4.3 and unemployment ben-
efits in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5 we use the Pontryagin Minimum Principle to
explicitly characterize E(·) and U(·).
4.1 Optimal Control
We formulate the principal’s problem for interval [0,m1] as one of optimal control. Our
analysis for [0,m1] applies to other intervals as well.
First, we rewrite the constraints recursively. The promise-keeping constraint (1) is
equivalent to the differential equation:
U ′(t) = r (U(t)− u(t)) + pi (U(t)− E(t)) .
On the right side of the differential equation, the first term is the rate of change of U when
there is no uncertainty (i.e., when there is no transition to employment), and the second
term captures the additional rate of change due to uncertainty.
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The incentive constraint (6) is equivalent to the following differential inequality:
r(v(cU(t) + w)− v(cE(t))) + E ′(t) ≤ 0. (7)
That is, the short term benefit that the agent gets from fraud, r(v(cU(t) + w)− v(cE(t))),
is offset by lower continuation utility he receives after he delays the employment report.
Note that E(·) could have downward jumps: when E(t) > lims↓tE(s), we interpret the
discontinuity as E ′(t) = −∞, and the differential inequality (7) still holds under this
interpretation. Introducing a slack variable µ(t) ≥ 0, we may rewrite (7) as
E ′(t) = rE(t)− e−ρwru(t)− µ(t).
In Lemma B.1 in Appendix C, we show that the above differential equation and in-
equality are equivalent to (1) and (6).
Second, the scaling property implies that the cost function C(·) satisfies
C(αU) = C(U)− log(α)/ρ.
Recalling the definition of c(·) in (5), we rewrite C(U) as
C(U) = C (|U |(−1)) = C (−1)− log(−U)/ρ ≡ ψ + c(U), (8)
where ψ ≡ C (−1) is the cost of private information: it is the one-time cost that the
principal is willing to pay to permanently remove private information from the model.
With ψ + c(U(m1)) as the continuation cost at m1, we rewrite the principal’s problem
as one of optimal control with a convex objective and linear constraints.
min
u(t),U(t),E(t),
0≤t≤m1
∫ m1
0
e−(r+pi)t (pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t))) dt+ e−(r+pi)m1(γ + ψ + c(U(m1))) (9)
subject to U ′(t) = (r + pi)U(t)− piE(t)− ru(t), (10)
E ′(t) = rE(t)− e−ρwru(t)− µ(t), (11)
E(t) ≥ U(t), (12)
U(0) is given.
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4.2 Continuation Utilities
The continuation utilities E(·) and U(·) help us uncover the consumption paths for the
employed and the unemployed. We focus on the properties of E(·) and U(·) in [0,m1];
those in other monitoring cycles can be obtained by scaling (see Lemma 1).
We demonstrate five properties:
(i) E(t) > E(s) for t < s ≤ m1.
(ii) E(t) > U(t) for all t < m1.
(iii) E(m1) = U(m1).
(iv) E(·) jumps up immediately after m1.
(v) U(·) declines over time.
Transition Time
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Figure 1: Lower payoff for late reporters (E(t) > E(s) for t < s)
Property (i) states that the payoff to a worker who reports the transition to employment
earlier is higher than the payoff to one who reports the transition later. The worker who
transitions to employment at t but commits fraud consumes cU(t) + w at t, whereas the
worker who tells the truth consumes cE(t). It is intuitive that cE(t) < cU(t) +w; otherwise
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deterring fraud would not be an issue. In terms of utilities, E(t) < e−ρwu(t). Incentive
compatibility (11) requires that delaying the report yields a lower payoff (see Figure 1).
Thus, E(t) > E(s) within a monitoring cycle.
For property (ii), recall that restriction (12) imposes E(t) must be greater than or
equal to U(t). If the agent who transitions to employment before m1 is offered the same
payoff as the agent who remains unemployed, then the employed agent will claim to be
unemployed and consume more than the unemployed agent. He can continue cheating
until the verification period m1 (see Figure 2). Thus, within a monitoring cycle, E(t) must
be greater than U(t).
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Figure 2: Continuation utilities E(·) and U(·) in [0,m1].
To understand (iii), note that the true employment status is revealed at m1, so the
principal does not face an incentive problem at that instant. Hence, there is no reason to
reward the (lucky) agent who transitioned to employment at m1 relative to the (unlucky)
agent who remains unemployed i.e., no reason to set E(m1) > U(m1). Thus, E(m1) =
U(m1). (Again, recall restriction (12): E(t) ≥ U(t) for all t.)
Property (iv) states that U(m1) = E(m1) < E(m1+), where E(m1+) is the utility for a
worker who is unemployed at m1 but transitions to employment immediately after m1, i.e.,
E(m1+) = limt↓m1 E(t) (see Figure 3). Suppose, to the contrary, that U(m1) = E(m1+).
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Then incentive compatibility in [m1, 2m1] would be violated because the worker employed
immediately after m1 can claim to be unemployed and consume more than the employed
until the next verification period, 2m1. Note that if there is no verification at date t, then
an upward jump in E(·) violates the incentive constraint: a worker who transitions to
employment prior to t would benefit from delaying the employment report. At the moment
of verification, however, the worker cannot delay the employment report since the true
employment status is revealed.
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Figure 3: Continuation utility E(·) is nonmonotonic.
To understand why U(·) declines, suppose U(m1) > U(0). Then lowering U(m1) has two
benefits. First, the unemployed agent’s continuation utility path is flatter, which implies
better insurance for the unemployed. Second, lower U(m1) (and E(m1)) reduces E
′(·),
generating stronger incentives to deter fraud. In addition, U(·) can never jump. Because
U(·) is the promised utility to the unemployed agent, any jump in U(·) would violate the
promise-keeping constraint.
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4.3 Employment Tax
Here we examine the consumption allocated to the agent who reports employment earlier
relative to the consumption for the agent who reports it later. Recall that E(t) > E(s)
within a monitoring cycle and the continuation utility E(·) jumps up after verification.
Since employment is an absorbing state, any agent who reports a transition to employment
at t is allocated constant consumption cE(t) forever and is not monitored. Thus, E(t)
maps into cE(t) instant by instant and, hence, cE(t) > cE(s) within a monitoring cycle.
Furthermore, the consumption for the agent who reports the transition to employment
immediately after m1 is higher than that for the employed agent at m1 (see Figure 4).
Time
cE
m1 2m1
Figure 4: Permanent consumption for workers who transition to employment in different
periods
The nonmonotonicity is closely related to the way incentives are provided in our model.
Within a cycle, the principal does not monitor, and relies exclusively on consumption
distortions to induce truth-telling: cE must fall sufficiently fast for the worker not to
postpone his report of employment. At m1, c
E falls to a level such that the agent is
indifferent between transitioning to employment and remaining unemployed. The principal
can perfectly insure the agent against the unemployment shock at m1 because the true
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employment status is revealed. Immediately after m1, the principal treats the worker
employed right after m1 better than the worker employed at m1. This is because the worker
who transitions to employment after m1 can commit fraud until the next monitoring period,
while the worker who transitions to employment at m1 cannot commit fraud. Hence, the
principal must offer the former a higher permanent consumption to induce truth-telling.
The difference between wage w and consumption cE can be interpreted as an employ-
ment tax. Our contract implies that within a verification cycle, the employment tax for late
reporters is higher than that for the early reporters. However, unlike the existing unemploy-
ment insurance literature, the employment tax is nonmonotonic: it decreases immediately
following verification.
4.4 Unemployment Benefits
Unlike the case where cE(t) maps into E(t) at every instant, cU(t) is not pinned down at
every instant by U(t), since the unemployed agent is not fully insured. Instead, the path of
cU(·) in [0,m1] requires knowledge of the entire path of U(·) in the interval. We obtain the
entire trajectories of cU(·) and U(·) after solving (9) in Section 4.5. However, monotonicity
of U(·) in Section 4.2 suggests that cU(·) declines with unemployment duration. As in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), our contract implies that the unemployment benefit cU
eventually reaches an arbitrarily low level with positive probability.6
Figure 5 shows that the unemployment benefits jump down at the verification period.
To understand the jump, we argue that it is optimal for the principal to set u(t) above
u(m1) when m1 − t > 0 is small. Doing this relaxes the incentive constraint at time t, as
the following variational argument shows. The promise-keeping constraint at m1− δ, for a
small positive δ, is
U(m1 − δ) = rδu(m1 − δ) + e−rδ[(piδ)E(m1) + (1− piδ)U(m1)]
= rδu(m1 − δ) + e−rδU(m1),
6In contrast to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and our paper, Pavoni (2007) imposes an exogenous lower
bound on promised utility and shows that the optimal benefits decrease with the duration of unemployment,
but remain constant after the promised utility reaches the lower bound. Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez (2009)
show a similar result in a model with an endogenous lower bound on promised utility.
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Figure 5: Consumption for the Unemployed
where the second equality uses the aforementioned property E(m1) = U(m1). The incentive
constraint at m1 − δ is
E(m1 − δ) ≥ rδe−ρwu(m1 − δ) + e−rδE(m1).
Suppose u(m1 − δ) = u(m1). Then the principal can maintain the promise-keeping con-
straint but relax the incentive constraint by increasing u(m1 − δ) and decreasing u(m1).
Specifically, consider the variation
u˜(m1 − δ) = u(m1 − δ) + e−rδ, u˜(m1) = u(m1)− , E˜(m1) = E(m1)− rδ.
Because the unemployed worker’s consumption after m1 remains unchanged, his contin-
uation utility at m1 is U˜(m1) = U(m1) − rδ, which is equal to E˜(m1). Therefore, the
promise-keeping constraint U(m1 − δ) = rδu˜(m1 − δ) + e−rδU˜(m1) still holds, and the
incentive constraint is relaxed:
rδe−ρwu˜(m1 − δ) + e−rδE˜(m1) = rδe−ρwu(m1 − δ) + e−rδE(m1)− (1− e−ρw)rδ
< rδe−ρwu(m1 − δ) + e−rδE(m1).
Starting from u(m1 − δ) = u(m1), the additional cost of consumption incurred by this
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variation is second order, but the effect on incentive constraint is first order. Hence the
principal always chooses u(t) above u(m1) when t is close to (but below) m1.
We summarize these findings in the following proposition. The proof is in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 The unemployment benefit, cU(·) is monotonically decreasing with unem-
ployment duration, with downward jumps at verification, while cE(·) is nonmonotonic: it
decreases between verifications with upward jumps immediately after verification.
Unemployment insurance systems in many countries feature benefits schemes similar to
the one in Proposition 2. For example in Spain, workers receive a replacement rate of 70
percent for the first 6 months of unemployment, 60 percent for the next 18 months, and a
minimum payment thereafter.
4.5 Pontryagin Minimum Principle
We construct a solution to the optimal control problem (9) in which the incentive
constraint (11) binds (i.e., µ(t) = 0) for all t < m1. The problem faced by the principal
is to choose an initial state E(0) and a time path u(·) to minimize the cost in (9), given
U(0). The promise-keeping and incentive constraints (10) and (11) then imply a time path
(U(·), E(·)) for continuation utilities. One way to think about this problem is to think of
choosing u(t) at each date, given the values of U(t) and E(t) that have been attained by
that date. The principal faces a tradeoff between the current-period cost and the cost of
delivering continuation utilities. Hence, she needs to set “prices”, Φ and λ, on increments
to the continuation utilities U and E. Because it is costly for the principal to maintain a
low E as a threat, it must be the case that λ ≤ 0. Moreover, we have argued in Section 4.2
that E(t) ≥ U(t) is slack except at m1, so we impose only the constraint E(m1) = U(m1).
A central construct in the optimal control problem is the current value Hamiltonian H
defined by
H = pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t)) + Φ(t)((r + pi)U(t)− piE(t)− ru(t)) + λ(t)(rE(t)− e−ρwru(t)),
which is just the sum of current-period cost and the rate of increase in continuation utilities
valued at Φ(t) and λ(t). An optimal allocation must minimize H at each date t.
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The first-order condition for minimizing H with respect to u is
c′(u) = Φ + e−ρwλ. (13)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of today’s utility, while the right-hand side is the
marginal cost of starting with higher continuation utility U tomorrow, offset by the benefit
of a slacker incentive constraint (it is a benefit because λ ≤ 0). The utility u must be
chosen to equalize the costs at each date.
The prices Φ and λ must satisfy
Φ′(t) = (r + pi)Φ− ∂H
∂U
= 0, (14)
λ′(t) = (r + pi)λ− ∂H
∂E
= pi(Φ− c′(E) + λ), (15)
at each date t if (u(·), U(·), E(·)) is an optimal path. Equation (14) implies that Φ(t) is a
constant. Moreover, since multiplier Φ(0) is the marginal cost of U(0), we have
Φ = C ′(U(0)) = −(ρU(0))−1 > 0.
Since the planner can choose E(0) freely,
λ(0) = 0. (16)
At m1, the shadow prices Φ and λ(m1) must satisfy
Φ = −κ+ c′(U(m1)), (17)
λ(m1) = κ, (18)
where e−(r+pi)m1κ is the multiplier on the constraint E(m1) = U(m1). Since the principal’s
problem is convex, these conditions (13–18) are both necessary and sufficient for a minimum.
When (11) holds as equality, the states (U,E) and the costate λ satisfy differential
equations:
U ′(t) = (r + pi)U − piE − ru, (19)
E ′(t) = rE − re−ρwu, (20)
λ′(t) = pi(Φ− c′(E) + λ). (21)
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The ODE system contains three variables and would be difficult to analyze in a general
context. However, we can solve (20) and (21) regardless of (19), because neither (20) nor
(21) relies on U . Once (20) and (21) are solved, it is easy to solve (19). Formally,
Lemma 2 If (20) and (21) hold, then (19) holds if and only if
ΦU(t) + λ(t)E(t) + ρ−1 = 0, ∀t ∈ [0,m1]. (22)
To solve the reduced ODE system, (20) and (21), we need two boundary conditions. The
first is (16), λ(0) = 0. The second cannot be a value for E(0), as E(0) is endogenous and
unknown a priori. We obtain the second boundary condition, E(m1) = −ρ−1(Φ+λ(m1))−1,
from E(m1) = U(m1) and equation (22).
The following lemma shows that these two boundary conditions pin down a unique
solution curve for the system (20) and (21). Figure 6 shows the phase diagram. That
λ < 0 implies that the incentive constraint binds for all t < m1.
Lemma 3 For any m1 > 0, there is a unique initial condition E(0) such that the solution
starting at (λ(0) = 0, E(0)) satisfies E(m1) = −ρ−1(Φ + λ(m1))−1.
(0, 0)
λ
E
E(0)
E = −ρ−1(Φ + λ)−1
Figure 6: Phase Diagram for (λ,E).
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5 Optimal Monitoring
Until this point, we have taken m1 as exogenous. In this section, we characterize
the optimal choice of m1. The tradeoff in choosing m1 is as follows. Monitoring more
frequently implies higher verification cost, but the principal can provide better insurance:
the consumption path for the unemployed is similar to that for the employed. Monitoring
less frequently implies lower verification cost but worse insurance.
For any m1 > 0, denote the minimized cost in (9) as C (m1); that is,
C (m1) =
∫ m1
0
e−(r+pi)t (pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t))) dt+ e−(r+pi)m1 (γ + ψ + c(U(m1))) .
Intuitively, delaying monitoring (i.e., a small increase in m1) saves the principal both the
cost of monitoring and the cost of (after-monitoring) consumptions, because the payment
of γ + ψ + c(U(m1)) is postponed. By doing so, however, the principal must maintain the
consumptions c(E(·)) and c(u(·)) for a longer duration. Subtracting the benefit from the
cost (algebraic details in Appendix C) yields
C ′(m1) = e−(r+pi)m1
(
rρ−1 log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
− (r + pi)(γ + ψ)
)
.
Thus, the first-order condition for m1 is
rρ−1 log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
= (r + pi)(γ + ψ). (23)
Proposition 3 The optimal m1 is the unique solution to (23). That is, (23) is both
necessary and sufficient for the minimum of C (m1).
Remark 1 Although our analysis relies on an undetermined parameter ψ, the parameter
can be uniquely pinned down by a fixed-point condition that the actual cost function at time
zero must equal the conjectured function ψ + c(U(0)). Further details are in Appendix C.
Remark 2 Our analytical results rely on the assumption of CARA preferences. Unlike the
CARA case where the length of the monitoring cycle is independent of history, the cycle
length in the CRRA case depends on the worker’s continuation utility. However, most
of the main features of the optimal contract remain valid even if the worker has CRRA
preferences. We demonstrate this through a numerical example in Fuller, Ravikumar, and
Zhang (2013).
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6 Quits
Another type of fraud that could arise in our model is quits. An agent in our model
could transition to employment in period t, claim to be unemployed until almost m1, and
then quit to become unemployed at m1. The verification at m1 would not reveal him to be
a cheater. Thus, quitting is possible in our model.
Our mechanism guarantees that the agent does not commit such a fraud. The contin-
uation utilities E(·) and U(·) are such that the agent is indifferent between reporting the
transition immediately and delaying it to the next period. By following the path above
and quitting at m1, he becomes truly unemployed, is subject to the stochastic arrival rate
of employment opportunity, and is worse off.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) examine a model where quits cannot be distinguished
from layoffs and the only fraudulent behavior is quits. In their model, the employment
status is observable and non-absorbing, and disutility from working is greater than that
from searching for employment. Employed agents might want to opportunistically quit
their job, enjoy more leisure, and collect unemployment benefits. To discourage quits, the
principal offers (i) higher consumption to the employed workers who stay on the job longer
and (ii) more generous benefits to unemployed workers with longer employment spells, as
quitters have shorter employment spells on average. In our model, the utility functions
for the unemployed worker and the employed worker are the same, and employment status
is private information. Since employment is an absorbing state, quitting as considered in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) cannot arise in our model. The potential reason for quitting
in our model is to cover up the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits before the
verification period. Our optimal mechanism provides incentives for the agent not to delay
reporting his transition to employment and not to conceal his earnings.
While overpayment due to quits is more than the overpayment due to insufficient search
and job refusals, it is small relative to the overpayment due to concealed earnings (see Table
1). Our mechanism deters fraud due to both concealed earnings and quits.
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7 Stochastic Verification
Our monitoring mechanism in the previous sections was restricted to deterministic veri-
fication. Here we consider a more general mechanism where the principal verifies randomly
after receiving the unemployment report. Conditional on the unemployment report at t,
the principal chooses the monitoring Poisson rate p(t) ≥ 0. That is, over a period of length
dt, the principal monitors with probability p(t)dt and she does not monitor with probability
1− p(t)dt. (Since our model is in continuous time, p(t) is not the monitoring probability.)
We assume that if a worker is monitored and caught cheating, he has to pay a finite
penalty forever. With infinite penalty, an arbitrarily small monitoring probability would
deliver the full-information constant consumption. In our model, if the principal can choose
any finite penalty between 0 and φ > 0, he would always choose φ. Henceforth, we assume
that the finite penalty is φ units of the consumption good, forever.
Similar to (10) and (11), the promise-keeping constraint and incentive constraint are
U ′ = r(U − u)− pi(E − U)− p(U˜ − U), (24)
E ′ ≤ rE − re−ρwu− p(eρφ − 1)E, (25)
where U˜ is the unemployed agent’s continuation utility after monitoring. Because the
probability that monitoring does not occur in [0, t) is e−
∫ t
0 p(s)ds, the principal’s objective is∫ ∞
0
e−(r+pi)t−
∫ t
0 p(s)ds
(
pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t)) + p(t)(γ + C(U˜(t)))
)
dt. (26)
The principal chooses the utilities {U(t), E(t), u(t), U˜(t); t ≥ 0} and the arrival rates of
monitoring {p(t); t ≥ 0} to minimize (26) subject to (24), (25), and the constraint E(t) ≥
U(t), ∀t ≥ 0.
Since the penalty for a worker with high promised utility is the same as that for a worker
with low promised utility, we obtain a scaling property similar to the one in Section 3.1.
Thus, the incentives to conceal earnings are the same for workers with different promised
utilities. Similar to our model with deterministic verification, we show in Proposition 4
that the optimal stochastic verification mechanism consists of cycles. See Appendix D for
the proof.
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Proposition 4 There exists an N > 0 such that the principal monitors the unemployed
with a constant arrival rate p > 0 if and only if t ≥ N . Before N , the time path (U(·), E(·))
converges to the 45-degree line; after N , it moves along the 45-degree line toward (−∞,−∞)
until the agent is randomly drawn to be verified. After the verification, (U,E) jumps to a
new state (U˜ , E˜) and a new cycle starts.
The unemployed worker is in one of two states: (i) not monitored (i.e., p(t) = 0) or (ii)
randomly drawn to be monitored (i.e., p(t) ≡ p > 0). Within each cycle, an unemployed
worker is initially in the not-monitored state. He is moved to the random monitoring state if
the duration of his unemployment report exceeds the threshold N . If he is randomly drawn
to be monitored, then he is moved to the not-monitored state after being monitored, and a
new cycle begins. While the date of monitoring is stochastic, the threshold duration is not.
That is, within each cycle, the principal guarantees that the worker will not be monitored
until the threshold duration is reached, similar to the deterministic verification case.
The intuition for why the worker is not monitored before the threshold duration is as
follows. The Unemployment Insurance agency has access to two instruments: tax/subsidy
and monitoring. Recall that at verification the true employment status is revealed, and E
is reset to a level such that its shadow price is zero, which means that, immediately after
monitoring, the employment tax can be varied at no cost. The cost of the tax/subsidy
instrument is lower than the cost of monitoring, γ > 0, immediately after monitoring, and
remains so until some threshold unemployment duration is reached. Hence, it is optimal to
use only the tax/subsidy instrument for the provision of incentives before the threshold.
Remark 3 The absence of verification until a threshold duration is unlikely to be robust to
other types of penalties. For instance, in Popov (2009) there is an exogenous lower bound
on the worker’s continuation utility and a worker who is caught cheating is pushed to this
lower bound. So the penalty for a worker with high continuation utility is larger than that
for a worker with low continuation utility. With hidden i.i.d. income, he shows that the
verification probability is always positive.
The stochastic monitoring mechanism clearly dominates the deterministic mechanism
characterized in Section 5. To see this, consider a stochastic monitoring scheme in which
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the arrival rate of monitoring is higher than p for workers in the random monitoring state.
Denote this higher arrival rate as p˜. Proposition 4 implies that p˜ is suboptimal. By
continuity, the limiting scheme as p˜→∞ should also be suboptimal. This limiting scheme
is exactly the deterministic monitoring mechanism.
We argue below that the key insights on the use of tax/subsidy and monitoring instru-
ments in the suboptimal deterministic mechanism are nearly identical to the insights from
the optimal stochastic mechanism. We describe in detail the similarities and differences
between the implications of the two mechanisms.
7.1 Comparison of Monitoring with the Deterministic Case
First, both the stochastic and deterministic mechanisms have the feature that monitor-
ing does not occur before a threshold unemployment duration; m1 in the deterministic case
and N in the stochastic case. These thresholds, however, could be different; i.e., in general
m1 6= N .
Second, both mechanisms feature cycles. In the deterministic case, after m1 a new cycle
begins, with exactly the same length as the previous cycle. Similarly, in the stochastic case,
after monitoring occurs a new cycle begins and verification does not occur again before the
threshold N is reached. The exact date when the monitoring occurs in the stochastic case
is random. This is because, after N monitoring arrives according to a Poisson process and,
hence, the exact length of each cycle depends on when the worker is actually verified. As
in the deterministic case, however, the value of N is the same in each cycle.
7.2 Comparison of Tax/Subsidy with the Deterministic Case
Consumptions in the stochastic monitoring case are similar to those in the deterministic
case. Within each cycle, before the threshold N , the patterns of consumption are identical
to (cE, cU) in Figures 4 and 5. After N , if a worker is monitored and verified to be truly
unemployed, then the unemployment benefits jump down, as in the deterministic case.
The only difference is that in the deterministic case, continuation utilities and consump-
tions are reset when the threshold m1 is reached. In the stochastic case, after the thresh-
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old N and before the monitoring actually arrives, continuation utilities and consumptions
smoothly decline with the duration of unemployment. The decreasing continuation utilities
and the monitoring (and finite punishment) jointly provide incentives for truth telling; the
worker is indifferent between reporting a job offer and committing fraud.
7.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we perform a quantitative exercise similar to Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997). We let the agents in our model face a stylized version of the U.S. unemployment
insurance system. We calibrate the model to match the observed rate of concealed earnings
fraud. We then compute the gain to switching to the optimal mechanism in our model.
To perform this exercise, we have to add some heterogeneity to our model; otherwise
everyone would cheat or no one would cheat, and we would not be able to match the ob-
served rate of concealed earnings fraud. We assume that the workers are heterogeneous
in the wages they earn and, hence, the replacement rate for unemployment benefits. Con-
cretely, we assume that the wage distribution is lognormal with parameters µw and σ
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Figure 7: Kernel Density Estimate of Weekly Wages, 2007.
The BAM data provides earnings information for an individual’s previous employment
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(the earnings that determine the amount of UI benefits for the individual). In the 2007
sample of BAM data, the mean weekly wage is $692 and the coefficient of variation is 0.79
(see Figure 7). Using these data moments, we calibrate µw = 6.296 and σ
2
w = 0.488. By
construction, the earnings in the BAM data are only for those who collect unemployment
benefits. Instead of using the BAM data we could use the CPS data on earnings for the
entire employed population to calibrate the wage distribution in the model. However,
individuals collecting unemployment benefits generally earn less (while employed) than the
individuals in the entire employed population.7
We calculate the unemployment benefits as a function of wages, again using the BAM
2007 data: ln(unemployment benefits) = 1.31 + 0.65 ln(wages).
We assume that the model period is 1 week and that the interest rate r = 0.001. Since
the average duration of unemployment in 2007 is 16.85 weeks, we calibrate the job arrival
rate to be pi = 1/16.85. The monitoring cost γ is calibrated as follows. On average, the
BAM investigators spend 12.6 hours per case and the average wage of the investigators is
$43 in 2012 (the only year when such data is available). So, adjusting the average wage to
2007 dollars, we calibrate γ to be $501. We calibrate the value of absolute risk aversion ρ
such that the relative risk aversion for the average wage earner is 2. Since average wage is
$692 in our sample, ρ = 2/692.
We then calibrate the probability of monitoring and the penalty in the U.S. system if
caught cheating to match two targets: fraction of people committing concealed earnings
fraud and fraction of people caught cheating among those committing the fraud.
With CARA preferences, wage heterogeneity is not relevant for matching the two tar-
gets, but it is relevant for computing the distribution of initial promised utility in the
baseline. In the counterfactual, we take these initial promised utilities as given, calculate
the optimal monitoring and benefits, and then compute the cost of delivering the initial
promised utilities. The job arrival rate, wage distribution, and penalty are held fixed at
the same values as the baseline calibration.
The results imply that, measured in present value, optimal monitoring costs 60 percent
7The mean weekly wage among employed workers, in the March 2007 CPS, is $861 and the coefficient
of variation is 1.27.
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less than the current U.S. system. In the optimal contract (averaging across the initial
promised utilities), N = 11.64 weeks. That is, the planner guarantees that monitoring
does not occur for roughly the first 12 weeks of the unemployment spell and, thus, reduces
the monitoring cost with an efficient use of the monitoring technology.
To determine the magnitude of the gain from switching to the optimal mechanism, sup-
pose that the planner is restricted to use the same amount of resources as the current U.S.
system. How much additional utility can the planner deliver to the average worker? The
answer is a utility gain equivalent to a 1.55% more consumption at every date, relative to
the U.S. system. This gain arises from two sources: (i) improved consumption smooth-
ing between employed and unemployed states and (ii) reduced monitoring costs or higher
consumption on average. The U.S. system spends only 0.24 percent its resources on mon-
itoring the average worker and spends the rest on unemployment benefits (net of wages),
but the same resources are allocated differently in the optimal contract: 0.17 percent is
spent on monitoring the average worker and the rest is spent on unemployment benefits.
Thus, almost all of the gain in our model comes from improved consumption smoothing.
8 Conclusion
The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. unemployment insurance system is
that individuals collect unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We exam-
ine a model of optimal unemployment insurance where a worker can conceal his employment
status and the Unemployment Insurance authority has a technology to verify his employ-
ment status. We find that the optimal interval between consecutive monitoring periods
is a constant, independent of history. The optimal employment tax is nonmonotonic, in-
creasing between verifications and decreasing immediately after a verification. The optimal
unemployment benefits decline with unemployment duration with sharp declines after each
verification. Our optimal contract also prevents fraud from quits.
Unemployment insurance in our model is a form of social insurance protecting workers
against the risk of job loss. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), Shimer and Werning (2008),
and Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez (2009) explore another role of unemployment insurance.
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They examine environments with heterogeneous jobs, and unemployment insurance helps
the worker wait for the appropriate job. Some jobs have higher productivity than others,
but such job opportunities arrive less frequently. Unemployment benefits help workers wait
for more productive matches and endure longer unemployment durations. The benefits
in these environments affect the aggregate composition of jobs. An interesting direction
for future research is to extend our environment to multiple jobs and examine optimal
monitoring in the presence of the alternative role of unemployment insurance.
Finally, our model does not include any job retention effort. Incorporating the job
retention effort into our model requires employment to be stochastic. If workers can conceal
earnings, their hidden income could affect their job retention effort. Analyzing interaction
between effort and fraud is another interesting direction for future research.
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Appendix A Data
This section describes data on the accuracy of payments in the U.S. unemployment
insurance system. We discuss three issues. First, we present an overall picture of unem-
ployment insurance expenditures and briefly describe the system in place for determining
the accuracy of the paid claims. Next, we provide details on the nature of “fraud” over-
payments by cause, from 2005 − 2009. Finally, we present data on how these fraudulent
payments were detected.
Total unemployment insurance expenditures in 2005, for example, were $30.2 billion.
These expenditures vary depending on aggregate economic activity; total expenditures
during the recession in 2009, for example, were $76.8 billion. These benefits are paid out
at the state level, with each state deciding its benefits and financing the benefits.
To determine the accuracy of these expenditures, the U.S. Department of Labor has a
program, referred to as BAM (Benefit Accuracy Measurement). The BAM program chooses
a random sample of weekly unemployment insurance claims and determines whether there
were any overpayments. The investigators also interview some claimants if necessary.
The goal of the program is different from the goal of unemployment insurance fraud
investigators. While the fraud investigators look to recapture overpayments, BAM in-
vestigators calculate statistics of the unemployment insurance program (see BAM State
Operations Handbook ET No. 495, 4th Edition). Of the total overpayments determined
by BAM, some represent simple errors in calculating benefits, while some represent fraud
overpayments. Table A.1 details the various types of fraud overpayments from 2005−2009,
averaged over all U.S. states.
Table A.1: Fraud Overpayments
Percent of Total Fraud Overpayments
Cause 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Concealed Earnings 62.64 54.40 60.06 67.32 65.89
Insufficient Job Search 4.55 4.15 4.95 3.02 2.75
Refused Suitable Offer 0.63 0.36 0.80 0.36 0.77
Quits 12.78 16.41 7.06 5.04 5.14
Fired 4.27 4.60 13.29 12.69 9.61
Unavailable for Work 4.94 6.95 4.17 4.60 7.38
Other 10.20 13.14 9.67 6.97 8.46
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Benefit Accuracy Measurement Program, U.S. Department of Labor
“Concealed Earnings” refers to payments to individuals who were simultaneously earn-
ing wages and collecting unemployment benefits. The category, “Insufficient Job Search,”
refers to cases where the individual did not meet the mandatory work search requirement
(e.g., a minimum number of job applications must be filed each week). “Refused Suitable
Offer” refers to cases where the individual was offered a job deemed suitable, but rejected
it. “Quits” and “Fired” are separation issues, where Quits refers to payments to individ-
uals who voluntarily left their job and Fired refers to payments to those who were fired
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from their job for a valid reason (e.g., poor performance or missing work). “Unavailable
for Work” refers to payments to persons who cannot work (e.g., disability).
The UI system might incur another form of overpayment if workers strategically delay
the start date of employment. That is, workers accept a job offer, but agree to start the job
after their UI benets have expired. For example, Gauthier-Loiselle (2011) documents that
the unemployment insurance expenditures are higher in Canada because of such cases. In
the U.S. system, this is not considered fraud. Workers are entitled to collect UI benefits
while waiting for an accepted job to start. Thus, the BAM data has no information on
such cases, so they are not included in the fraud overpayments statistics.
The data in Table A.1 represent our calculations from the raw data files provided to
us by the U.S. Department of Labor. More general statistics from the BAM program are
available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/bqc.asp. Note, however, that our
definitions and calculations differ slightly from those used in the BAM reports available
online. In our calculations, we restrict attention to the cases of fraud that relate to the
incentive problem we study in this paper and to the incentive problems that the existing
literature has focused on.
Is Concealed Earnings fraud easy to detect? Table A.2 displays different detection
technologies used by BAM. For example, “Verification of search contact” is when the BAM
investigator verifies whether a potential job contact reported by the unemployed person
is indeed true. “Claimant Interview” is an actual interview with the person collecting
benefits, etc. The numbers in the table represent the percentage of each type of fraud
uncovered by that particular method. More than 90 percent of the overpayments due to
Concealed Earnings fraud were not detectable under the standard procedures available to
the State authorities. This suggests that a more costly verification is necessary to uncover
overpayments due to Concealed Earnings.
Table A.2: Detection Technologies, 2007
Detection Method
Percent of concealed earnings
fraud overpayments detected by method
Verification of search contact 1.31
Verification of wages and/or separation 62.02
Claimant interview 10.41
Verification of eligibility with 3rd parties 1.38
Unemployment insurance records 14.61
Job/employment service records 0.17
Verification with union 0.71
Crossmatch with state directory of new hires 7.52
Crossmatch with state wage record files 1.86
Source: Benefit Accuracy Measurement Program, U.S. Department of Labor
In Table 1 in Section 1, we reported that the overpayments due to Concealed Earnings
fraud were almost twelve times the overpayments due to Insufficient Search fraud. Do
the data understate the incidence of insufficient search? Recall that the BAM program
measures only the extensive margin — whether the individual submits the required number
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of applications. It is possible that the unmeasured intensive margin — effort that turns an
application into a job offer — is large enough to make the overpayments due to Insufficient
Search comparable in magnitude to the overpayments due to Concealed Earnings. The
following facts, however, suggest that the unmeasured component is unlikely to be large.
(i) Measured overpayments due to Insufficient Search have been declining: in 1988, they
accounted for 34 percent of the total overpayments due to all fraud whereas in 2007
they accounted for less than 5 percent (the corresponding numbers for Concealed
Earnings fraud were 41 percent and more than 60 percent).
(ii) The job search requirements that make an unemployed person eligible for benefits
have increased over time, so the decline in the measured component is not due to
changes in eligibility criteria. Hence, for the Insufficient Search overpayments to be
the same in 2007 as those measured in 1988, the unmeasured component has to be
almost six times that of the measured component in 2007.
(iii) If unmeasured efforts to translate a job application into a job offer were substantially
higher in 2007, then the increase in efforts should manifest itself in a substantially
higher transition rate from unemployment to employment. However, the evidence
suggests that the transition rate is roughly constant: the quarterly rate was 0.31 for
the period 1988-1997 and 0.33 for 1998-2007.
From a normative point of view, as noted in Section 1, the prevailing quantitative theory
prescribes an intensive margin search effort that is less than the effort exerted under the
current unemployment insurance program in the U.S. In other words, insufficient search is
not a critical incentive problem in the U.S. (See also the evidence presented in Ashenfelter,
Ashmore, and Deschenes (2005).)
Appendix B Microfoundations for E(t) ≥ U(t)
Suppose that the worker can privately refuse a job offer. The timing in each period is
as follows. The stochastic job opportunity arrives and the worker either receives an offer or
does not. He then chooses to report the offer (if any) to the principal. Conditional on the
report of an offer, the principal recommends the worker to either accept or reject the offer.
The worker then chooses whether to follow the principal’s recommendation. (In contrast,
job acceptance is implicitly imposed in our model in Section 2.) Conditional on the report,
the principal assigns current and future consumptions.
In such a job-refusal model, it is optimal for the principal to always recommend to the
worker who reports an offer to accept the offer. Recommending “accept” minimizes the
cost of delivering the promised utility since the worker’s consumption is constant upon
job acceptance and the principal gets the perpetual wage. Recommending “reject” means
that the continuation contract involves additional uncertainty of job offers, reports, and
incentive constraints. So the consumption cost of delivering the same promised utility
is higher under “reject.” Recall that, unlike Atkeson and Lucas (1995), we do not have
disutility to working so it is optimal to always recommend “accept.”
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The incentive compatibility for an agent with a job offer is as follows. If he reports his
offer and receives a recommendation to accept, he strictly prefers “accept” to “reject.” This
is because rejecting the offer would not make him eligible for any unemployment insurance
benefits, but would make him lose his wage income. If the agent does not report his offer,
then either he rejects the offer and obtains U(t), or he accepts the offer and commits fraud
(i.e., he works and collects unemployment benefits at the same time). For the agent to
truthfully report his offer, the utility of reporting and accepting the offer, E(t), must be
higher than both U(t) and the utility he obtains by committing Concealed Earnings fraud.
These Incentive Compatibility constraints are exactly conditions (2) and (3) in our model
in Section 2.
Appendix C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that a contract σ ≡ {(U(t), E(t), u(t), cU(t), cE(t),mi) ; t ≥
0, i ≥ 1} delivers the continuation utility U . Then, a contract
σα ≡
{(
αU(t), αE(t), αu(t), cU(t)− log(α)/ρ, cE(t)− log(α)/ρ,mi
)
; t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1}
delivers αU . The reverse is also true. Further, σ is incentive compatible if and only if σα
is incentive compatible. Therefore,
{(
U∗(t), E∗(t), u∗(t), cU∗(t), cE∗(t),m∗i
)
; t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1} is
the optimal contract to deliver U if and only if{(
αU∗(t), αE∗(t), αu∗(t), cU∗(t)− log(α)/ρ, cE∗(t)− log(α)/ρ,m∗i
)
; t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1}
is the optimal contract to deliver αU . 
Lemma B.1 The promise-keeping constraint (1) and the incentive constraint (6) hold for
all 0 ≤ t < s ≤ m1 if and only if
U(s)− U(t) =
∫ s
t
((r + pi)U(x)− piE(x)− ru(x)) dx, (27)
E(s)− E(t) ≤
∫ s
t
(
rE(x)− re−ρwu(x)) dx, (28)
hold for all 0 ≤ t < s ≤ m1. Taking the limit as s goes to t yields the differential equations
(10) and (11).
Proof. We only show the equivalence between (6) and (28), since the equivalence between
(1) and (27) can be obtained similarly by replacing the inequalities below with equalities.
39
Necessity: If (6) holds for all t < s, then
E(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rE(x)− re−ρwu(x)) dx
≥
∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)re−ρwu(x)dx+ e−r(s−t)E(s)
+
∫ s
t
(
r
(∫ s
x
e−r(η−x)re−ρwu(η)dη + e−r(s−x)E(s)
)
− re−ρwu(x)
)
dx
=
(
e−r(s−t) +
∫ s
t
re−r(s−x)dx
)
E(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(x−t) − 1) re−ρwu(x)dx
+
∫ s
t
r
(∫ s
x
e−r(η−x)re−ρwu(η)dη
)
dx
= E(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(x−t) − 1) re−ρwu(x)dx+ ∫ s
t
(∫ η
t
re−r(η−x)dx
)
re−ρwu(η)dη
= E(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(x−t) − 1) re−ρwu(x)dx+ ∫ s
t
(
1− e−r(η−t)) re−ρwu(η)dη
= E(s).
Hence, inequality (28) is verified.
Sufficiency: Define an absolutely continuous function f(·) as
f(s) ≡
∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)re−ρwu(x)dx+ e−r(s−t)
(
E(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rE(x)− re−ρwu(x)) dx) .
Because f is absolutely continuous, it is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.), and
f ′(s) = e−r(s−t)re−ρwu(s)− re−r(s−t)
(
E(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rE(x)− re−ρwu(x)) dx)
+e−r(s−t)
(
rE(s)− re−ρwu(s))
= re−r(s−t)
(
E(s)− E(t)−
∫ s
t
(
rE(x)− re−ρwu(x)) dx) , a.e.
If (28) holds, then f ′(s) ≤ 0 a.e. Then, it follows from Theorem 29.15 in Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw (1990) that
f(s) = f(t) +
∫ s
t
f ′(x)dx ≤ f(t) = E(t).
Therefore, ∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)re−ρwu(x)dx+ e−r(s−t)E(s) ≤ f(s) ≤ E(t),
which verifies inequality (6). 
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Proof of Lemma 2: If (19), (20) and (21) all hold, we can substitute them into
(ΦU + λE)′ and obtain
(ΦU + λE)′ = ΦU ′ + λ′E + λE ′
= Φ ((r + pi)U − piE − ru) + pi (Φ− c′(E) + λ)E + λ(rE − re−ρwu)
= (r + pi) (ΦU + λE)− pic′(E)E − r(Φ + e−ρwλ)u.
Because −c′(E)E = ρ−1 and −(ρu)−1 = c′(u) = Φ + e−ρwλ, we have
(ΦU + λE)′ = (r + pi)
(
ΦU + λE + ρ−1
)
. (29)
Because ΦU(0) +λ(0)E(0) + ρ−1 = 0, it follows from (29) that ΦU(t) +λ(t)E(t) + ρ−1 = 0
for all t ∈ [0,m1].
On the other hand, if (20) and (21) hold and
ΦU(t) + λ(t)E(t) + ρ−1 = 0, ∀t ∈ [0,m1],
then (ΦU + λE)′ = 0 for all t ∈ [0,m1]. Then (19) can be derived by reversing the above
steps. 
(0, 0)
g(0)
g
λ
Φ
Φeρw
line g = Φ+ λ
line g = Φeρw + λ
Figure 8: Phase Diagram for (λ, g).
Proof of Lemma 3: First, it is convenient to transform the state variable E, which
may approach −∞, into a bounded one. To do so, we replace E with
g ≡ c′(E) = −(ρE)−1.
Now, the ODE system consists of (21) and
g′ =
E ′
ρE2
=
rg2
Φeρw + λ
− rg, (30)
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with boundary condition g(m1) = Φ + λ(m1) (Figure 8 shows the phase diagram). Let
m(g(0)) be the time to hit the straight line g = Φ + λ starting with (λ(0) = 0, g(0)).
Second, we show that limg(0)↓Φm(g(0)) = 0. If λ = 0 and g = Φ, then
(g − λ)′(t) =
(
rg2
Φeρw + λ
− rg + pi(g − λ− Φ)
)∣∣∣∣
(λ,g)=(0,Φ)
=
rΦ2
Φeρw
− rΦ < 0.
Continuity of the ODE system (21), (30) implies that (g−λ)′(t) < 0 in a small neighborhood
of (0,Φ). If λ(0) = 0 and g(0) approaches Φ from above, then g(0)− λ(0)− Φ approaches
zero. Since the solution curve starting with (0, g(0)) will remain in the small neighborhood
of (0,Φ) for a while, it will decrease and hit the line g = Φ + λ quickly if g(0)− λ(0)− Φ
is sufficiently small.
Third, we show that m(g(0)) is strictly increasing in g(0). Consider two paths that start
with initial conditions (0, g1(0)) and (0, g2(0)), where Φ < g1(0) < g2(0). We will show that
g1(t)− λ1(t) < g2(t)− λ2(t) for all t. By contradiction, suppose (g1 − λ1)(t) = (g2 − λ2)(t)
for the first time at t = t∗. Because the two paths cannot cross, we cannot have that
g1(t
∗) ≤ g2(t∗). Then g1(t∗) > g2(t∗) and λ1(t∗) > λ2(t∗). Hence
(g1 − λ1)′(t∗) = − rg1
Φeρw + λ1
(Φeρw + λ1 − g1)− pi(Φ + λ1 − g1)
< − rg2
Φeρw + λ2
(Φeρw + λ2 − g2)− pi(Φ + λ2 − g2)
= (g2 − λ2)′(t∗),
where the inequality follows from g1
Φeρw+λ1
> g2
Φeρw+λ2
. That (g1 − λ1)′(t∗) < (g2 − λ2)′(t∗)
contradicts the facts that (g1 − λ1)(t∗) = (g2 − λ2)(t∗) and (g1 − λ1)(t) < (g2 − λ2)(t) for
all t < t∗. Thus g1(t) − λ1(t) < g2(t) − λ2(t) for all t, and the path (λ1(t), g1(t)) reaches
g = Φ + λ sooner.
Finally, we show there exists a unique g(0) to satisfy m(g(0)) = m1 for any m1 > 0.
The second step in this proof shows that limg(0)↓Φ m(g(0)) = 0. Part (ii) in Lemma B.2
(page 45) shows that m(g(0)) can be arbitrarily large with high values of g(0). Hence, the
existence of a unique solution to m(g(0)) = m1 follows from the intermediate value theorem
and the monotonicity of m(g(0)) in g(0). 
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we show that E, cU , U , and U
E
all fall on [0,m1]. It
follows from g′(t) < 0 that E ′(t) = ρE2(t)g′(t) < 0. Equation (13) implies that u′(t) =
e−ρwλ′(t)
c′′(u) < 0, or (c
U)′(t) < 0. Equation (22) implies that U ′(t) = −Φ−1(λ(t)E(t))′ < 0.
Equation (22) also implies that U
E
= Φ−1(g−λ). Hence part (i) in Lemma B.2 implies that(
U
E
)′
(t) < 0.
Second, to see the downward jump in cU(·) at m1, we show that
lim
t↑m1
c′(u(t)) > lim
t↓m1
c′(u(t)).
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The left side is Φ + e−ρwλ(m1) according to (13). To obtain the right side, we apply (13)
to the interval [m1, 2m1), and obtain
c′(u(t)) = C ′(U(m1)) + e−ρwλ˜(t), t ≥ m1,
where λ˜ denotes the multiplier λ for the problem on the interval [m1, 2m1). Because
λ˜(m1) = 0, we have limt↓m1 c
′(u(t)) = c′(u(m1)) = C ′(U(m1)) + 0 = Φ + λ(m1). Therefore,
lim
t↑m1
c′(u(t)) = Φ + e−ρwλ(m1) > Φ + λ(m1) = lim
t↓m1
c′(u(t)).

Proof of Proposition 3: First, because Φ+e
−ρwλ
Φ+λ
decreases in λ, and λ(m1) decreases
in g(0) and m1, there is a unique value for g(0) (as well as m1) for a given ψ.
Second, to show that (23) is sufficient, we prove that
C ′(m1)
{
< 0, m1 < m
∗
1;
> 0, m1 > m
∗
1.
This is because Φ+e
−ρwλ(m1)
Φ+λ(m1)
strictly increases in m1:
Φ+e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ+λ(m1)
decreases in λ(m1) and
the proof of Lemma 3 shows that λ(m1) decreases in g(0) and m1. 
Details in the computation of C ′(m1)
Rewrite C (m1) as∫ m1
0
e−(r+pi)t
(
pic(Em1) + rc(um1) + Φ((r + pi)Um1 − piEm1 − rum1 − (Um1)′)
+λm1(rEm1 − re−ρwum1 − (Em1)′))dt+ e−(r+pi)m1 (γ + ψ + c(Um1(m1)))
+e−(r+pi)m1λm1(m1)(Em1(m1)− Um1(m1)),
where we put a superscript m1 on U(·), E(·), u(·), and λ(·) because these optimal paths
rely on m1. We use the Envelope theorem to simplify the computation of C ′(m1). Since
Um1(t), Em1(t), um1(t) are already optimally chosen at each t, we may view them as fixed
when we vary m1. Further, U
m1(m1) and E
m1(m1) can be viewed as varying only with the
terminal date in the parenthesis.8 Viewed in this light, a small increment of m1 is just an
extrapolation of all time paths over a longer duration of unemployment, while the paths
themselves are fixed. That is, we view all superscripts as being fixed and omit them when
we calculate derivatives. Because E(m1)− U(m1) = 0, we have
C ′(m1) = e−(r+pi)m1
(
pic(E(m1)) + rc(u(m1))− (r + pi)(γ + ψ + c(U(m1)))
+c′(U(m1))U ′(m1) + λ(m1) (E ′(m1)− U ′(m1))
)
.
8This is because U m˜1(m1) and E
m˜1(m1) can be viewed as being fixed when we vary m˜1.
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It follows from c′(U(m1)) = Φ + λ(m1), λ′(m1) = 0 and Lemma 2 that
c′(U(m1))U ′(m1) + λ(m1) (E ′(m1)− U ′(m1))
= ΦU ′(m1) + λ(m1)E ′(m1) = (ΦU(m1) + λ(m1)E(m1))
′ = 0.
Therefore,
C ′(m1) = e−(r+pi)m1
(
pic(E(m1)) + rc(u(m1))− (r + pi)(γ + ψ + c(U(m1)))
)
= e−(r+pi)m1
(
rρ−1 log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
− (r + pi)(γ + ψ)
)
.
Fixed-point condition for ψ
The condition for ψ is that ψ is the fixed point of operator T , i.e.,
ψ + c(U(0)) = T (ψ) + c(U(0)) ≡ min
σ
C(σ).
We obtain ψ from the first-order condition (23) for m1,
ψ =
rρ−1
r + pi
log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
− γ.
We obtain T (ψ) from the HJB equation for the cost function at time zero
T (ψ) + c(U(0)) =
pic(E(0)) + rc(u(0)) + Φ ((r + pi)U(0)− piE(0)− ru(0))
r + pi
=
pi
r + pi
(
Φ
g(0)
− log
(
Φ
g(0)
)
− 1
)
+ c(U(0)).
The fixed-point condition ψ = T (ψ) is rewritten as
(r + pi)γ = rρ−1 log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
− pi
(
Φ
g(0)
− log
(
Φ
g(0)
)
− 1
)
. (31)
Proposition 5 The path that satisfies (31) exists and is unique.
Proof. The existence of a path that satisfies (31) follows from the intermediate value
theorem and the fact that right side of (31) is either extremely large or extremely small if
we vary g(0). To see this, note that the proof of Lemma 3 shows that limg(0)↓Φm1 = 0 =
limg(0)↓Φ λ(m1). Therefore,
lim
g(0)↓Φ
rρ−1 log
(
Φ + e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ + λ(m1)
)
− pi
(
Φ
g(0)
− log
(
Φ
g(0)
)
− 1
)
= 0.
On the other hand, the proof of part (ii) of Lemma B.2 shows the existence of paths with
λ(m1) approaching −Φ and g(0) ∈ (Φ,Φeρw). For these paths, log
(
Φ+e−ρwλ(m1)
Φ+λ(m1)
)
can be
arbitrarily large, while Φ
g(0)
remains bounded.
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The uniqueness can be shown by contradiction. Suppose there are two paths satisfying
(31). Associated with the two paths are two fixed points, ψ < ψ˜. Because the principal
facing ψ˜ may monitor at m1(ψ) > 0 and adopt the optimal consumption paths under ψ,
T (ψ˜) ≤ ψ + e−(r+pi)m1(ψ)(ψ˜ − ψ) < ψ˜,
which contradicts the fact that ψ˜ is a fixed point. 
Lemma B.2 Consider the ODE system (21), (30) with time running backwards, that is,
λ′ = pi(g − Φ− λ), (32)
g′ = rg − rg
2
Φeρw + λ
. (33)
Suppose the initial condition is (λ(0), g(0) = Φ + λ(0)), −Φ < λ(0) < 0, and m−(λ(0))
denotes the first time to hit the g-axis, i.e., m−(λ(0)) = mint{t > 0 : λ(t) = 0}.
(i) (g − λ)′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,m−(λ(0))].
(ii) m−(λ(0)) is finite, and limλ(0)↓−Φ m−(λ(0)) =∞.
Proof.
(i) The path starting with (λ(0), g(0) = Φ + λ(0)) has
λ′(0) = pi(g(0)− Φ− λ(0)) = 0,
g′(0) = rg(0)− rg(0)
2
Φeρw + λ(0)
> 0.
Hence it moves beyond g = Φ + λ at time zero and satisfies Φ + λ < g < Φeρw + λ
before reaching the g-axis. If Φ + λ < g < Φeρw + λ, then g′ > 0 and λ′ > 0.
To show that (g − λ)′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,m−(λ(0))], suppose to the contrary that
(g − λ)′(s) ≤ 0 for some s. Let t∗ = mins{s > 0 : (g − λ)′(s) ≤ 0}. It is easily seen
that (g−λ)′(t∗) = 0 and (g−λ)′′(t∗) ≤ 0. Since (g−λ)′ = rg− rg2
Φeρw+λ
−pi(g−Φ−λ),
(g − λ)′′(t∗) =
(
r − 2rg(Φe
ρw + λ)
(Φeρw + λ)2
− pi
)
g′(t∗) +
(
rg2
(Φeρw + λ)2
+ pi
)
λ′(t∗)
=
(
r +
rg2 − 2rg(Φeρw + λ)
(Φeρw + λ)2
)
g′(t∗)
= r
(Φeρw + λ− g)2
(Φeρw + λ)2
g′(t∗) > 0,
where the second equality follows from g′(t∗) = λ′(t∗). This contradicts that (g −
λ)′′(t∗) ≤ 0.
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(ii) First, we show that m−(λ(0)) is finite. We know from part (i) that λ′ > 0. It follows
from (32) and (g − λ)′ > 0 in part (i) that
λ′′ = pi(g − λ)′ > 0.
Hence starting from λ(0) < 0, λ(t) accelerates and will reach zero in finite time.
Second, we show that limλ(0)↓−Φ m−(λ(0)) =∞. If λ(0) = −Φ and g(0) = 0, then
λ′(0) = pi(g(0)− Φ− λ(0)) = 0,
g′(0) = rg(0)− rg(0)
2
Φeρw + λ(0)
= 0.
Continuity of the ODE system (32), (33) implies that (λ, g) will stay in a small
neighborhood of (−Φ, 0) for a long duration if λ(0) is sufficiently close to −Φ and
g(0) = Φ + λ(0). Therefore, limλ(0)↓−Φ m−(λ(0)) =∞.

Appendix D Stochastic Verification
D.1 Construction of a Contract
To prove Proposition 4, we first construct a contract σ∗ in which E(t) > U(t) implies
p(t) = 0, and E(t) = U(t) implies p(t) > 0. This contract has the features described in
Proposition 4, and in the next section we verify it is indeed optimal.
First, since the principal does not monitor in this contract when E > U , we still use
the ODE system (20), (21) to find a solution path in the interval [0, N ], where N satisfies
−
∫ N
0
λ(t)
(
rE − re−ρwu) dt− λ(N)(eρφ − 1)E(N) + γ = 0. (34)
The two boundary conditions for the ODE system (20), (21) are still λ(0) = 0 and E(N) =
−ρ−1(Φ + λ(N))−1.
Lemma 4 The N that satisfies (34) exists and is unique.
Proof. For uniqueness, we show that f(N) ≡ − ∫ N
0
λ(t) (rE − re−ρwu) dt − λ(N)(eφ −
1)E(N) decreases with N . Since both λ(N) and E(N) are negative and decreasing with
N , −λ(N)(eφ − 1)E(N) decreases with N . Moreover,
−λ (rE − re−ρwu) = r|λ|
g(Φeρw + λ)
(g − λ− Φeρw).
For fixed t, r|λ|
g(Φeρw+λ)
increases with N , while (g − λ− Φeρw) is more negative with higher
N . Therefore, − ∫ N
0
λ (rE − re−ρwu) dt decreases with N too. For existence, note that
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limN→0 f(N) = 0. Because limN→∞ λ(N) = −Φ and limN→∞E(N) = −∞, we have
limN→∞ f(N) = −∞. 
Second, choose p > 0 after N so that the state vector stays on the 45-degree line before
the monitoring arrives, i.e., U(t) = E(t) for all t ≥ N . Choosing U˜(N) = U(0) = − 1
ρΦ
and
solving the equation U ′(N) = E ′(N), we have
p =
r(1− e−ρw)(Φ + e−ρwλ(N))−1
eρφ(Φ + λ(N))−1 − Φ−1 > 0. (35)
Note that p is independent of Φ. This also implies that p > 0 is time invariant after N
because U(t) = E(t) for t ≥ N .
Third, the constructed solution path defines a contract σ∗ as follows. For each t ∈ [0, N ],
the policy u(t) is obtained by the first-order condition (13)
u(t) = − 1
ρ(Φ + e−ρwλ(t))
. (36)
If t ≥ N , then the state vector moves along the 45-degree line, and u(t) is always propor-
tional to (U(t), E(t)). That is, for all t ≥ N ,
u′(t)
u(t)
=
E ′(t)
E(t)
=
U ′(t)
U(t)
= r − r(Φ + λ(N))
Φ + e−ρwλ(N)
+ p
(
1− Φ + λ(N)
Φ
)
> 0. (37)
The contract σ∗ is defined by (34–37), and the property that the continuation contract
after a monitoring at t ≥ N starts a new cycle, in which the continuation utility is
U˜(t) = Φ+λ(N)
Φ
U(t) instead of U(0). In this construction, σ∗ has the features mentioned in
Proposition 4.
D.2 Optimality of the Contract
First, using the path obtained in Lemma 4, we construct a cost function C as
(r + pi)C(U(t), E(t)) = pic(E(t)) + rc(u(t)) + Φ((r + pi)U(t)− piE(t)− ru(t))
+λ(t)(rE(t)− re−ρwu(t)). (38)
Lemma 5 CU(U(t), E(t)) = Φ, and CE(U(t), E(t)) = λ(t).
Proof. Differentiate (38) with respect to t, we have
(r + pi)(CUU
′(t) + CEE ′(t)) = pic′(E)E ′(t) + Φ((r + pi)U ′(t)− piE ′(t)) + λ(t)rE ′(t) + λ′(t)E ′(t),
which, after substituting λ′(t) = pi(Φ− c′(E) + λ), becomes
CUU
′(t) + CEE ′(t) = ΦU ′(t) + λ(t)E ′(t).
Homogeneity of C(·, ·) implies that CUU(t) +CEE(t) + ρ−1 = 0 = ΦU(t) + λ(t)E(t) + ρ−1.
Because the vectors (U ′(t), E ′(t)) and (U(t), E(t)) are linearly independent (we have shown
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that
(
U
E
)′
(t) < 0 in the proof of Proposition 2, which is E
′(t)
E(t)
> U
′(t)
U(t)
), we have CU = Φ and
CE = λ(t). 
Second, we verify that the cost function C satisfies the HJB equation:
(r + pi)C(U,E) = min
u,p,U˜ ,E˜
{
rc(u) + pic(E) + p
(
C(U˜ , E˜) + γ − C(U,E)
)
(39)
+CU
(
r(U − u)− pi(E − U)− p(U˜ − U)
)
+CE
(
rE − re−ρwu− p(eρφ − 1)E)},
where (U˜ , E˜) is the new state vector the principal chooses after the next monitoring.
Lemma 6 The C(·, ·) defined in (38) satisfies (39).
Proof. The only differences between (38) and (39) are the terms associated with arrival
rate p, which will be shown to be zero in this proof. Fix a t ∈ [0, N ] and consider the HJB
equation at (U(t), E(t)). The first-order condition for U˜ implies that U˜ = U(0). Then we
have
C(U˜ , E˜) + γ − C(U,E)− Φ(U˜ − U)− CE(eρφ − 1)E
= −
∫ t
0
λ(s)
(
rE(s)− re−ρwu(s)) ds− λ(t)(eφ − 1)E(t) + γ.
The above is decreasing in t because λ(t) < 0, and E(t) < 0 both decrease in t. Moreover,
the integral − ∫ t
0
λ(s) (rE(s)− re−ρwu(s)) ds decreases in t because
rE(t)− re−ρwu(t) = E ′(t) = ρE2(t)g′(t) < 0.
Therefore, the definition of N in (34) implies that
C(U˜ , E˜) + γ − C(U,E)− Φ(U˜ − U)− CE(eρφ − 1)E
{
> 0, if t < N,
= 0, if t = N.
This implies that
min
p≥0
p
(
C(U˜ , E˜) + γ − C(U,E)− Φ(U˜ − U)− CE(eρφ − 1)E
)
= 0,
which finishes the proof. 
Finally, to complete the proof of Proposition 4, we show that the contract σ∗ is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4: Because the technique of using the HJB equation to verify
optimality is standard, we spare the reader of detailed steps. Given the initial promised
utilities (U,E), we need to verify that
(i) The cost of the contract σ∗ is C(U,E).
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(ii) The costs of other I.C. contracts are weakly higher than C(U,E).
We only verify (ii) here, since the proof for (i) can be obtained simply by replacing the
following inequalities with equalities.
To see that the cost of an I.C. contract
{
(c˜E(t), c˜U(t), p˜(t)); t ≥ 0} is higher than
C(U,E), define
h(T ) =
∫ T
0
e−(r+pi)t−
∫ t
0 p˜(x)dx
(
pic(E˜(t)) + rc˜U(t) + p˜(t)
(
C(U˜(t), E˜(t)) + γ
))
dt
+e−(r+pi)T−
∫ T
0 p˜(x)dxC(U(T ), E(T )).
The HJB equation implies that f ′(T ) ≥ 0. Therefore, h(T ) increases in T , and
C(U,E) = h(0) ≤ h(T ).
Taking limit T →∞, we have
C(U,E) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+pi)t−
∫ t
0 p˜(x)dx
(
pic(E˜(t)) + rc˜U(t) + p˜(t)
(
C(U˜(t), E˜(t)) + γ
))
dt,
which can be rewritten as
C(U,E) ≤ E
[∫ τ1
0
e−rt
(
pic(E˜(t)) + rc˜U(t)
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−rτ1γ
]
+E
[
e−rτ1C(U˜(τ1), E˜(τ1))
]
,
where τ1 is the first monitoring time and (U˜(τ1), E˜(τ1)) is the state vector immediately
after monitoring. Inductively, we obtain
C (U,E) ≤ E
[∫ τn
0
e−rt
(
pic(E˜(t)) + rc˜U(t)
)
dt
]
+ E
[
n∑
i=1
e−rτiγ
]
+E
[
e−rτnC(U˜(τn), E˜(τn))
]
,
where τn is the nth monitoring time. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
limn→∞ τn = ∞ almost surely (otherwise the principal monitors infinitely many times in
finite time and the monitoring cost is infinity). Taking limit n→∞ yields
C (U,E) ≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
pic(E˜(t)) + rc˜U(t)
)
dt
]
+ E
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−rτiγ
]
.

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Appendix E Imperfect Detection
This section presents a version of the stochastic verification model where detection is
imperfect. Specifically, there is a positive probability $ > 0 of monitoring error. In the
event of monitoring error, an unemployed worker is labeled as employed. If an unemployed
worker is monitored after reporting unemployment, the principal observes either an un-
employed signal U with probability 1 − $ or an employed signal E with probability $.
On the other hand, there is no monitoring error that labels an employed worker as being
unemployed, i.e., if an employed worker is monitored after reporting unemployment, the
principal observes E with probability one.
The timing of the problem is similar to the stochastic verification case in Section 7.
The planner still chooses the arrival rate of monitoring, p(t), conditional on the report of
unemployment in period t. There are, however, two differences in the case of imperfect
detection. First, the planner assigns continuation utilities based not only on whether or
not monitoring occurs (as above) but also on the signal from monitoring. Let UU(t) and
UE(t) be the continuation utilities of a monitored unemployed worker with signals U and
E at t, respectively. Let EE(t) be the continuation utility of a monitored employed worker
(whose signal can only be E) at t. Finally, EU(t) is the continuation utility of a monitored
unemployed worker with signal U who transited to employment immediately after being
monitored. Second, the penalty is exogenous in the case of perfect detection above, but is
endogenous with imperfect detection.
Similar to (24) and (25), the promise-keeping constraint and incentive constraint are
U ′ = r(U − u)− pi(E − U)− p [(1−$)UU +$UE − U ] , (40)
E ′ ≤ rE − re−ρwu− p(EE − E). (41)
There are two differences between these two equations and (24) and (25). First, the promise-
keeping constraint (40) incorporates the possibility that an unemployed worker may be
labeled as employed after monitoring. Second, in (25) the last term on the right-hand side
results from the exogenous and finite penalty, φ, whereas in (41) the last term allows the
penalty EE to be endogenous.
The main results from the perfection detection case and stochastic monitoring still hold
here. That is, the optimal monitoring mechanism consists of cycles. Within each cycle,
there exists some N such that the planner sets p = 0 before N , and then monitors at rate
p thereafter. Formally we state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 There exists an N > 0 such that the principal monitors the unemployed
with a constant arrival rate p > 0 if and only if t ≥ N . Before N , the time path (U(·), E(·))
converges to the 45-degree line; after N , the utility pair (U(t), E(t)) remains stationary
(i.e., U(t) = E(t) = U(N) = E(N) for all t ≥ N) until the worker is randomly drawn
to be monitored. If the observed signal from monitoring is E, the worker is punished,
UE = EE < U(N). If the signal is U , the worker is rewarded, UU > U(N), and the contract
enters a new cycle.
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